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We are reminded of the capacity in people everywhere…to slip into pure evil. We cannot
abolish that capacity, but we must never accept it…We did not act quickly enough after
the killing began. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name:
genocide…It is not an African phenomenon and must never be viewed as such…We
must have global vigilance. And never again must we be shy in the face of the evidence. 1
In March 1998, United States President William J. Clinton traveled to Rwanda as part of
an extended trip to Africa aimed to demonstrate a renewed promise of “peace and prosperity”
and illustrate a positive image of Africa to the American people. 2 Standing on the tarmac at the
Kigali airport, Clinton addressed the people of Rwanda with a heavy heart. His speech was an
apology to an entire nation for the lack of vigilance by the United States, and the entirety of the
international community, to stop the genocide that had occurred there in 1994. Throughout his
speech, Clinton recognized the faults of his administration stating, “we did not immediately call
these crimes by their rightful name: genocide.” 3 While recognizing his administration’s
mistakes, Clinton also highlighted a way forward with new hope after the tragedy. He said, “we
cannot change the past. But we can and must do everything in our power to help you build a
future without fear, and full of hope.” 4 Clinton acknowledged the mistakes of his administration
when all key policymakers ignored the multiple warning signs that genocide would ensue.
Ultimately, the United States pursued a policy of non-intervention, and this decision led to
devastating repercussions for the entirety of the international community. Clinton’s apology
speech was due to the blatant and intentional actions pursued by the United States to stand by
while humanity suffered. One must ask, if there were clear signs of genocide presented to the
administration, why were actions not taken sooner?
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Despite concrete evidence of the violence in Rwanda, the United States passively stood
by while hundreds of thousands of ethnic Tutsi residents were brutally slaughtered by ethnic
Hutus. The factors that led to this foreign policy decision are important to consider in order to
understand the underlying incentives presented by the United States not to step forward when
humanity needed strength the most. The core argument presented by Clinton himself, and other
policymakers, was that intervention in Rwanda did not align with U.S. political or economic
interests. There were no clear incentives for the United States to intervene in Rwanda, and
therefore when the genocide occurred, the United States did not see any clear benefits to the cost
of American lives and money required by a military intervention. Another factor that influenced
the Clinton administration’s foreign policy of non-intervention was the United States past
involvement in world conflicts. The United States was recently involved in a humanitarian
intervention in Somalia which resulted in humiliation for the administration. The failure in
Somalia acted as a strong deterrent for the administration to get involved in another African
conflict. Instead, the Clinton administration brushed the violence aside. The United States also
failed to comply with international obligations to intervene under the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. However, in the months to come it
became clear that the killings perpetrated by the Hutu was a planned and systemic attack against
the ethnic Tutsi community.
The foreign policy decision of non-intervention changed the perception of the United
States on the international stage. It was clear that under the Clinton administration, when a call
for help was made, the strong economic and military world power turned away while thousands
were murdered because intervention did not fit into U.S. foreign policy objectives. This begs the
question of why Clinton traveled to Rwanda four years after the genocide, and four years after he
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neglected to make the easy call to save lives. In the years after Clinton left office, in interview
after interview, he admitted that his lack of direct action led to the loss of thousands of more
lives. Despite knowledge of the genocide, Clinton and his advisors ignored the signs of genocide
because of the lack of clear U.S. economic and political interests in Rwanda, the recent downfall
in Somalia, and wariness of international obligations which led the United States to pursue a
policy of non-intervention in the Rwandan genocide.
The Rwandan Genocide
The circumstances that led to the massacre of about 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu in
Rwanda had colonial origins. 5 The exclusion of specific ethnic communities from political
participation and the ethnic division between Hutu and Tutsi were the most prominent causes of
the conflict. 6 The history of the ethnic division in Rwanda dates back to European imperial rule
in Africa. Germany colonized Rwanda as part of its larger German East African Empire, and
ruled the nation until the end of World War I when Belgium gained Germany’s African colonies
under a League of Nations mandate. 7 Both imperial rulers favored the Tutsi minority over the
Hutu majority in all aspects of social and political life. The suppression of the rights of the Hutu
majority resulted in a polarizing division between Hutu and Tutsi communities. This division
was encouraged by imperial rulership, and over time led to deep rooted sentiments of hatred
between the two ethnic groups in Rwanda that lasted throughout post-colonial era and into the
modern age.
These differences, rooted in a history of discrimination, came to head on the evening of
April 6, 1994 when a plane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyariamana and Burundi
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President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down while descending into the Kigali International
Airport. The U.S. Ambassador David Rawson and his wife heard the explosion from their
residence in the city. 8 The killing of the Rwandan President marked the beginning of a military
coup led by the Hutu and sparked the violence that would quickly escalate to genocide. The main
victims of the genocide were men, women, and children from the minority Tutsi ethnic group.
Also murdered were many members of the majority Hutu ethnic group who opposed the new
regime. 9
After the plane crash, information regarding the stability of the country was rapidly
transferred from the ground in Rwanda by both U.S. diplomats and ambassadors back to
Washington, D.C. The reality of the death of President Habyariamana was a shock to many in
Washington and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Prudence Bushnell was especially
concerned about the probable outbreak of mass killing in Rwanda. 10 Bushnell wrote in a memo
to Secretary of State Warren Christopher that “if, as it appears, both Presidents have been killed,
there is a strong likelihood that widespread violence could break out in either or both
countries.” 11 Many frantic messages, similar to the one by Bushnell, expressed concern about the
instability in Rwanda and that the violence could led to genocide. However, with constant
messages pouring in, Washington was frazzled with information and lacked a clear strategy
forward. 12
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The National Security Council African Affairs Office consistently sent information
providing updates about what was happening on the ground. On April 7, 1994, Donald K.
Steinberg wrote, “The situation in Rwanda continues to deteriorate. There was open fighting in
the streets of Kigali; cannons and gunfire can be heard regularly.” 13 In less than twenty-four
hours after the plane went down, the U.S. National Security Council received direct information
defining the violence as “primarily inter-ethnic.” 14 The reality of the conflict eventually led the
U.S. State Department to authorize “an ordered departure of all American personnel from
Kigali.” 15 The decision for the immediate withdrawal of all American personnel from Rwanda
confirmed the administration’s fear for American lives. However, the eventual removal of
peacekeeping forces further demonstrated that the United States intended to pursue a policy of
non-intervention despite the overwhelming evidence and concern of the killings in Rwanda and
an ultimate disregard for human life.
On April 12, 1994, the United Nations Security Council voted to pull out peacekeepers
from Rwanda. 16 This decision came after long and antagonizing debates between the fifteen
members of the Security Council. These meetings were meant to be behind closed doors where
the representatives of each country could keep their political agenda hidden from public scrutiny.
However, as the conflict ensued, the Security Council met even more consistently deliberating
how to handle the quickly deteriorating situation. 17 With the decision to pull out the U.N.
peacekeepers from Rwanda, the international community allowed circumstances of genocide to
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continue. The discussions within the Security Council were more concerned with ending the civil
war through negotiation between the two factions rather than focusing on a plan for intervention
to halt the mass killings. 18 This decision left a limited number of 250 peacekeeping forces in
Rwanda with the order not to use force against the Hutu forces and no aid was in sight. 19 Thus,
the removal of U.N. peacekeepers demonstrated that the United States would continue to push
for an international response of non-intervention in Rwanda, which tragically resulted in the
death of hundreds of thousands of innocent people.
The Factors of Non-Intervention
The consequences of the Rwandan genocide shocked the world. The number of men,
women, and children slaughtered from April to June in 1994 caused the international community
to refocus on their role in the world when responding to humanitarian crises. 20 For reasons
associated with the policy of non-intervention, the international community stood by and did
nothing to prevent the genocide. At the onset of the violence, U. N. peacekeepers in Rwanda
made consistent efforts to contain the violence perpetrated by the Hutu. However, despite these
constant efforts, the U.N. Security Council, with pressure from the United States, rejected all
further requests for assistance. It was not until well after the gravity of the genocide was revealed
to the international community that the United States finally took small actions to prevent any
further killings. 21 The key motivations that led the United States to pursue a policy of nonintervention were the lack of U.S. interests in the region, the fallout from the 1993 humanitarian
intervention in Somalia, and the deliberate disregard of international obligations.
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In the post-World War II era, the United States began to pursue foreign policy relations
with African nations. Past policy decisions in the region affected the Clinton administration’s
policy of non-intervention in the Rwandan genocide. After the war, many African countries
experienced periods of transformation as many nations gained independence from European
colonial powers. 22 This process of decolonization was marked by increased violence as factions
within African nations fought for governmental control. This instability further contributed to the
inability of African nations to create new states and establish effective systems of government. 23
After the period of decolonization, U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa were heavily
influenced through a Cold War lens. The policy of containment was especially prevalent in order
to subdue communist parties in African nations. 24 During the Cold War, the United States
supported many movements in African countries that were opposed to communist influences. 25
The United States aimed to maintain the status quo around the world form Soviet threats in order
to preserve American national security interests abroad. 26 In a Cold War lens, both the United
States and the Soviet Union saw the instability in Africa as a chance to utilize their global power
and influence to put a friendly government in power. 27
Throughout the 1980s, African nations experienced continuous periods of change marked
by civil conflicts. For example, apartheid in South Africa and the war of succession in Angola,
presented new challenges for African nations and the international community. 28 These regional
conflicts for economic and political power throughout Africa influenced neighboring countries
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which in turn led to longer periods of instability. 29 In Rwanda, the United States developed
diplomatic relations rather than direct economic or political policies; shying away from the Cold
War policy of containment. As a land-locked country, Rwanda was not of great interest to the
United States, especially in terms of economic relations. There were no major ports, oil, or other
rich minerals the United States could exploit for their own economic gain. Because of these
factors, and the lack of a communist threat in Rwanda, U.S. relations with the small country
never developed beyond financial support to promote development and friendly diplomatic
relations. 30
The United States did not promote strong foreign policy relationships with Rwanda or
express clear incentives to become involved in the domestic politics of the small African
country. Therefore, when the violence in Rwanda began, the main priority of the United States
was to quickly remove all American personnel and walk away. In a speech delivered at the U.S.
Naval Academy Commencement, President Clinton further reiterated the policy objective of
non-intervention stating:
We cannot solve every such outburst of civil strife…simply by sending in our forces. We
cannot turn away from them, but our interests are not sufficiently at stake in so many of
them to justify a commitment of our folks. Nonetheless, as the world’s greatest power,
we have an obligation to lead, and at times, when our interests and our values are
sufficiently at stake, to act. 31
Clinton recognized the responsibility of the United States as the leading world power after the
Cold War. And, as the world’s greatest power, the United States had an obligation to lead and
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demonstrate to the entirety of the international community that intervention was required when
humanity cried out for help.
However, Clinton pushed the political opinion that U.S. foreign policy was driven by the
protection and preservation of American interests and values abroad. As mentioned above,
historically the United States did not have economic or political interests in Rwanda. Therefore,
when the genocide began in April 1994 the United States ignored the violence because a
commitment of U.S. troops to Rwanda did not align with American interests and values. An
article published in the New York Times further reiterated this point stating, “without oil or other
resources as a rationale, the case for military intervention would have to be based on whether
ending the killing is worth the cost in American lives and dollars.” 32 In the eyes of Clinton and
his administration, the moral obligation to save lives was secondary to their own political agenda
abroad.
The American media criticized the policy of non-intervention pursued by the Clinton
administration in response to the Rwandan genocide. In an article published in the Washington
Post, Charles Krauthammer wrote “Rwandans are black, African, foreign” evoking the argument
of otherness. 33 Krauthammer argued that Clinton and his advisors ignored the signs of genocide
because Rwandans were “foreign” to Americans. In the eyes of the administration and the
American public, the violence in Rwanda was seen outside the scope their own lives, interests,
and values. Additionally, Krauthammer argued that the way that the situation in Rwanda was
presented by the administration symbolized that the United States pursued non-intervention
because of the concept of “otherness.” Krauthammer argued that the Clinton administration
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supported an intervention from African nations rather than Western countries stating, “the best
answer is a regional force drawn from African countries.” 34 He claimed that the United States
believed the conflict was a problem in the region of Africa, therefore those nations who “have
already volunteered troops for Rwanda peacekeeping” should be the ones to step in to stop the
slaughter. 35
The United States involvement in Somalia in 1993 was another element that influenced
the policy of non-intervention in Rwanda. Prior to Clinton’s election to office, Somalia
experienced years of instability which led to the collapse of the Somali state in January 1991. 36
This resulted in the rise of insurgency movements and violent conflicts between various clans for
power. Between August 1991 and January 1992, lawlessness, looting, and factional fighting
spread throughout Somalia. The absence of governmental capacity led to instability and a lack of
law and order throughout the country. 37 The growing anarchy in Somalia was coupled with the
growing threat of starvation. Warlords of the fighting clans stole humanitarian food aid and
traded it for weapons to fight the ongoing civil war. While some U.S. policymakers argued the
crisis in Somalia was “a food problem, not a security problem,” the Clinton administration
decided to intervene on humanitarian grounds. 38
However, the United States led intervention in Somalia resulted in humiliation and
widespread political turmoil for the administration. The first steps of intervention by the United
States consisted of airlifting food aid into the country. This form of humanitarian aid marked the
beginning of U.S. leadership in Somalia. Nevertheless, the future decision to intervene with force
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only heightened frustrations in the region. 39 In October 1993, eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed
in Somalia during a military operation known as Black Hawk Down. The loss of U.S. service
members in Somalia resulted in domestic political tensions and attacks by Congress against the
Clinton administration and the United Nations. 40 The fallout from Somalia caused the United
States to reevaluate their response to humanitarian crises around the world. Historical memory
from the debacle in Somalia influenced the foreign policy decisions of the administration in
response to the genocide in Rwanda. Instead of realizing their moral obligation to intervene, the
Clinton administration feared another domestic retaliation. The negative consequences of the
humanitarian mission in Somalia loomed over the administration and resulted in the weariness
presented by the United States to get involved in another crisis in Africa.
International law declares that the international community has the responsibility to
intervene to preserve peace and security. The international community recognized their
obligation to intervene in Somalia but ignored the responsibility to stop the genocide in Rwanda.
The term genocide was defined by Raphael Lemkin and later codified by the United Nations
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as:
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group;
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group. 41
The 1948 Genocide Convention symbolized the international community’s commitment to
prevent and punish genocide committed after the Holocaust. This international obligation
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established a firm understanding that “the Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they
undertake to prevent and to punish.” 42 In 1988, the United States ratified the 1948 Genocide
Convention therefore binding themselves to abide by this vital international obligation.
However, during the first three weeks of the genocide in Rwanda, the Clinton
administration’s most prominent policymakers neglected to use the term genocide when
addressing the violence in Rwanda. A discussion paper from the Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Middle East/African Region stated, “Be Careful…Genocide finding
could commit USG [U.S. Government] to actually ‘do something.’” 43 The call to “be careful”
when referencing the killings in Rwanda clearly demonstrated to other State Department officials
that U.S. foreign policy decisions did not include intervention. Additionally, the administration
gave U.S. spokesmen specific directions not to say the word genocide because, in the case that
the violence was in fact genocide, the United States government would be obligated to “do
something.” Further, an article in the New York Times echoed similar sentiments writing that “the
Clinton administration has instructed its spokesmen not to describe the deaths there as
genocide.” 44 The article added that “the State Department and the National Security Council
have drafted guidance instructing spokesmen to say merely that “acts of genocide may have
occurred.” 45 The deliberate choice not say the g-word ensured that the administration stayed
clear of any obligations on moral grounds and under the terms of 1948 Genocide Convention. 46
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As the killing continued, the U.S. State Department faced increased pressure to label the
violence as genocide. 47 The evidence that genocide had in fact occurred was astounding. Reports
of bodies floating down the river and the body count in the hundreds of thousands proved to
many officials that what they feared was in fact true. In a memorandum to the Secretary of State,
Warren Christopher approved that “Department officials [were] to state publicly that “acts of
genocide have occurred” in Rwanda.” 48 The change in word choice by the Secretary of State
demonstrated to reporters and the American public that the mass slaughter was more than crimes
against humanity. However, the phrase “acts of genocide” still protected the United States from
their obligation to intervene under international law. 49 Also, by using the phrase “acts of
genocide” the United States saw an opportunity to preserve credibility with the American public
and influential human rights organizations. 50 However, Christopher still restricted the use and
application of the g-word declaring that the “delegation is not authorized to agree to the
characterization of any specific incident as genocide or agree to any formulation that indicates
that all killings in Rwanda are genocide.” 51 The loosened restrictions demonstrated a slight
change in policy dynamics, but the deliberate decision to avoid the term genocide continued to
ensure that the United States would not have to fulfill their legal obligation to intervene. Further,
this policy decision to avoid the term genocide was also economically and politically self-serving
for the United States.
President Clinton himself was also guilty of straying away from the term genocide. On
August 1, 1994 President Clinton wrote to the Speaker of the House regarding the deployment of
Cohen, One Hundred Days of Silence, 138.
George E. Moose, John Shattuck, Douglas J. Bennet, and Conrad K. Harper, “Has Genocide Occurred in
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U.S. armed forces to Rwanda. The decision to send any troops to Rwanda was not made until
four months after the genocide began in early April 1994. The decision to send troops was long
awaited by the peacekeepers in Rwanda, but ultimately the small acts of intervention were too
little too late. Moreover, in his correspondence to the Speaker of the House, Clinton minimized
the situation in Rwanda calling the atrocity a “humanitarian crisis,” rather than genocide. 52
Again, the administration neglected to respond with strength and leadership towards the conflict
in Rwanda. Instead, Clinton purposely ignored the signs and did not call the violence genocide
which in turn resulted in the death of innocent people and his own humiliation for not facing the
evidence right in front of him.
Therefore, international obligations to prevent genocide became significantly problematic
as the United States continued to pursue a policy of non-intervention. The international
obligation to intervene outlined in the 1948 Genocide Convention threated the United States. In
order to purse a policy of non-intervention, the administration purposely prohibited the use of the
term genocide in all press releases and public speeches. Instead of using the g-word, the
administration instead stated that “acts of genocide” were happening in Rwanda. This specific
decision not to use the word genocide to describe the violence occurring in Rwanda
demonstrated the United States would not recognize their international obligation to intervene
under the 1948 Genocide Convention. If the Clinton administration declared the violence in
Rwanda as genocide it would spark an international response and the United States was not
prepared to respond. The responsibility to intervene was at play and the administration did not
want to be bound by international legal obligations. Thus, the Clinton administration did not
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make a statement directly calling the violence in Rwanda a genocide and continued to pursue the
policy of non-intervention.
Conclusion
Looking back on the Rwandan genocide, it is not hard to imagine how the United States
could have acted differently. As the violence escalated after the plane crash on the evening of
April 6, 1994, the United States could have completed requests form the U.N. peacekeepers to
send troops. Once the killing of thousands of Rwandans began, President Clinton could have
committed U.S. troops to Rwanda. The White House senior officials could have publicly
denounced the killings. The United States could have encouraged the United Nations Security
Council to condemn the slaughter and commit to prosecute those perpetrating the genocide.
However, none of these actions took place. When the slaughter began, the United States did
nothing.
The genocide in Rwanda marked a turning point in the role of the United States on the
world stage. The United States under the leadership of President Clinton did not fill the role of
world leader, but instead took a backseat approach to foreign policy. When violence erupted, the
Clinton administration ignored clear signs of genocide and failed to publicly define the violence
by its true name: genocide. Ultimately, the administration pursued a policy of non-intervention in
Rwanda due to the lack of U.S. economic and political interests, the downfall in Somalia a year
prior, and the wariness to fulfill international legal obligations under the 1948 Genocide
Convention.
The decision to pursue a policy of non-intervention resulted in detrimental consequences
for the people of Rwanda and the Clinton administration. In terms of international law, the
Rwandan genocide demonstrated that the 1948 Genocide Convention does not, in practice,
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protect innocent groups of people. Further, it is the political will of powerful countries that
determines the fate of the ‘helpless.’ The Rwandan genocide marked a shift in U.S. foreign
policy towards non-intervention in world conflicts. Instead of exhibiting strength and
international leadership, President Clinton found himself in a position of weakness, standing on
the tarmac in Kigali, apologizing for his own grave mistakes.
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Research Narrative
In 1994, over 800,000 ethnic Tutsi and moderate Hutu were brutally slaughtered by
ethnic Hutu in Rwanda. This international atrocity challenged the United States’ foreign policy
response to humanitarian crises in the post-Cold War era. As the world’s leading superpower, the
United States, under the leadership of the Clinton Administration, faced a choice to intervene on
moral grounds or pursue foreign policy based solely on American interests overseas. In a speech
at the Naval Academy commencement, President Clinton stated, “as the world’s greatest power,
we have an obligation to lead, and at times, when our interests and our values are sufficiently at
stake, to act.” 1 Despite knowledge of the ethnic tensions and increased threats of violence in
Rwanda, the Clinton Administration pursued a policy of non-intervention. My research paper
examined the various factors that influenced how the United States prioritized political and
economic interests over moral obligations when electing not to intervene in response to the
genocide in Rwanda.
There were many steps that went into my overall research process. In the early stages of
the process, I visited Special Collections with my class for Dr. Turek’s course on U.S. Foreign
Relations. While at Special Collections, the class organized into pairs and we sorted through
primary sources available to us in the library collections. The visit to Special Collections allowed
me to see how many primary sources were directly available to me though the library resources,
ask specific questions about the research process, and begin preliminary research on my own
paper topic. After the class visit to Special Collections, I began the bulk of my individual
research for this project. At the beginning of the research process, I knew that I wanted to focus
on foreign policy events during the Clinton Administration. As a political science and history
double major, I aimed to combine both my studies of international criminal law and human rights
with U.S. history.
Once I solidified my research topic, I began to find primary and secondary sources for
my annotated bibliography. I began my research process by talking over my paper topic with Dr.

William J. Clinton, “Naval Academy Commencement Speech,” 25 May 1994, Annapolis, Maryland, United States,
C-SPAN, https://www.c-span.org/video/?57239-1/naval-academy-commencement-speech&start=3979, 43:50-44:18.
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Turek during office hours. I was given a number to books and articles to build from as the base
of my research. From there I utilized many of the library resources to help guide my research
process. I relied on the LibGuide created for the U.S. Foreign Relations course to access various
databases to find secondary and primary sources. I used JSTOR to find secondary sources on the
history of U.S. foreign policy in Africa. I also used key terms, such as Rwanda, genocide, and
U.S. foreign policy, to search for specific articles related to my research topic. Another helpful
secondary source I found through the library was a Frontline documentary highlighting the
events of the Rwandan genocide titled “The Ghosts of Rwanda.” Further, I used Interlibrary
Loan to gain access to a few books on the Rwandan genocide that were not directly available to
me at the library.
Next, while searching for primary sources, I utilized ProQuest Congressional; a database
I was able to access through the library. Through this database I found declassified government
documents. In order to find sources related to my research topic, I used the advanced search
function to narrow down my search results by date and using specific key terms. This database
was incredible useful to me because I was able to search through Congressional profiles,
Hearings, Committee reports, and other high-level government documents. I also found primary
sources on the Clinton Presidential Library website. Through the Presidential Library’s online
platform, I accessed numerous declassified documents from the Clinton Administration. Some of
these documents were from top White House officials who briefed the President on the events
leading up to the Rwandan genocide. After completing the annotated bibliography, I wrote my
first draft of my research paper. Once receiving comments from Dr. Turek on my rough draft, I
then continued to edit my paper and then submitted the final draft of my research paper.

2

